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Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the spatial politics of US immigration detention from three 
angles. I first give a general overview of the US immigration enforcement system in 
order to situate detention in the broader regime of spatial practices used to control 
transboundary mobility. While immigration has long been linked to both security and 
crime, mandatory detention has become a key component in the process of deportation, 
especially under the rubric of post-9/11 counter-terrorism initiatives. Second, I outline 
noncitizen’s pathways into and out of detention centers to show how specific forms of 
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legal authority give US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and 
Border Patrol (CBP) wide discretion to decide who to detain, where, in what conditions, 
and for how long. I focus on the series of discretionary decisions ICE and CBP officers 
make about noncitizens’ individual cases, tracing detention’s legal geography from the 
perspective of detained women and families at the T Don Hutto Detention Center in 
Taylor, Texas. Third, moving from the outside in, I analyze how detention visitation 
programs seek to challenge the detention's isolation, containment, and banishment. 
These organizations’ efforts to access detention centers—or more accurately, the 
detainees inside—reveal how counties, state legislators, private contractors, and federal 
agencies claim overlapping authority to regulate detention centers. In addition, 
visitation programs seek to challenge detention’s exclusionary function through 
companionship and, in doing so, focus on detained migrants’ emotional, spiritual, and 
bodily experiences. Visitation's spatial politics illuminates not only relations of power 
that enable detention as a spatial strategy of mobility control, but also how citizens and 
authorized residents confront, negotiate, and contest the spatial practices of US 
immigration enforcement. 
The chapter builds on questions raised during previous research on ICE's 
detention of noncitizen families (Martin 2011, 2012a, b) and my participation in the 
formation of a visitation program at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center (Hutto 
hereafter) in 2010. Hutto is a 512-bed former medium security prison owned by the 
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) that was retrofitted to hold families from 
2006 to 2009. Half of the facility was converted to detain adult women in 2007, and 
since the Obama administration’s release of families in 2009, the facility has held 
exclusively women. Whereas my original research project explored the legal figuration 
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of families and children as legal subjects (Martin 2011), the disciplinary functions of 
detention-as-deterrence policies (Martin 2012a), and family governance discourses 
(Martin 2012b), my experience visiting Hutto raised important questions about the 
spatial politics of challenging detention.
1
 To further explore how visitation programs 
navigated detention’s enclosure and isolation, I interviewed current Hutto Visitation 
Program participants individually and in a focus group in 2011. I knew from conversing 
with visitation program coordinators that other programs faced bigger institutional 
challenges accessing detained noncitizens. To provide a more representative picture of 
visitation’s power geometries, I interviewed program coordinators from Sojourners’ 
Immigration Detention Center Visitor Program (New York/New Jersey) and Detention 
Dialogues (San Francisco Bay Area, California).
2
 Sojourners has been visiting detainees 
at the Elizabeth Detention Center, also owned by CCA, since 1999, while Detention 
Dialogues had only recently gained access to the West County Detention Center, a 
county-owned facility, after over a year of negotiations with ICE and county officials. I 
was interested not in providing sociological description of US visitation programs as a 
whole,
3
 but rather in (1) citizens’ negotiations with immigration officials and, (2) how 
they opened up a critical vantage point for analyzing how state power. While the first 
two sections describe noncitizens’ pathways into and out of detention, the third section 
                                                          
1
 ICE released families from Hutto in the fall of 2009, but continued to detain women there; the Berks 
County Family Shelter Care Center in Pennsylvania detained families until December 2011, and is 
currently preparing a new facility so that it can continue to hold families for ICE. 
2
 Ideas for and drafts of this chapter were shared with interview and focus group participants prior to 
publication, and I am deeply indebted to their insights. 
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illuminates how immigration detention’s legal geography bounds and encloses detention 
centers within the United States.  
 
 
Enforcing Immigration: Borders, Crime, and Security 
Since 1889, the US federal court system has continually reaffirmed that 
immigration is a trade and foreign policy matter and therefore that immigration law- and 
policy-making belong to the legislative and the executive branches of the US federal 
government. Called “the plenary doctrine,” this legal maneuver sets immigration law 
apart from other constitutionally bound legal regimes, limiting noncitizens' 
constitutional protections in immigration proceedings.  Until the late 1970’s, however, 
border and immigration enforcement did not retain a high priority in public or foreign 
policy-making.  A series of high-profile refugee arrivals from Central America and the 
Caribbean stoked a growing public perception in some political quarters that the US' 
southern borders were “out of control.” In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act instituted the first criminal penalties for immigration–related crimes into 
immigration law, and in the decade following, immigration law became more punitive. 
The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
mandated detention for vague--and therefore broad--categories of documented and 
undocumented migrants. An ever-expanding list of “aggravated felonies” triggered 
mandatory detention, and the new Expedited Removal program deputized then-INS 
(and now ICE) officers to order certain noncitizens deported without immigration court 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3
 Visitation Network coordinators are, however, currently in the process of collecting this kind of data, 
which promises to be valuable to understanding the politics of detention at different detention centers. 
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review.  As Coleman (2007a) argues, IIRIRA expanded spaces of immigration policing 
and shrunk judicial oversight and constitutional protections for noncitizens.   
Immigration officials have relied primarily on the prison system for both 
detention expertise and infrastructure to meet the needs of mandatory detention. 
Emphasizing the deportation of "criminal aliens," IIRIRA linked immigration status to 
criminality, and expanded criminal penalties (i.e., jail time) for immigration-related 
violations, such as carrying false identification. Thus, the growth of immigration 
detention as an enforcement strategy followed the discursive and institutional linking of 
immigration and crime, and the bulk of new detention bed-space appeared in former 
prisons and military barracks. Over the same period, the US prison system also grew at 
an unprecedented rate, fueled by zero-tolerance and "truth-in-sentencing" laws across 
the country (Austin et al. 2001, Gilmore 2007). As Teresa Miller has shown, 
immigration and criminal justice systems borrowed from one another, rolling back court 
review and privileging administrative decision-making over judicial representation 
(Miller 2003). Expanding the discretionary authority of intermediaries like Deportation 
Officers and limiting judicial discretion to release noncitizens or grant residency 
resonates with broader shifts in governmental strategies in other countries, as Gill 
(2009a) as shown in the United Kingdom. In the name of ‘cutting red tape,’ 
immigration decision-making in the United States has been devolved to local 
jurisdictions and delegated to non-state actors, such as private prison operators. So 
while confinement has become a preferred method for addressing a range of public 
policy issues in the US, including but not limited to immigration, it also reflects broader 
reconfigurations of state power that increasingly embrace the proliferation of closed, 
opaque spaces (Gregory and Pred 2006; Paglen 2010). 
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Against the backdrop of "crimmigration," post-9/11 developments in domestic 
security governance tied immigration to national security and territorial vulnerability 
(Martin 2012a). For example, Customs and Border Protection (responsible for 
immigration apprehensions at ports of entry, territorial borders, and increasingly abroad 
see Coleman 2007b) reframed transboundary mobility as a counter-terrorism issue:   
Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the primary focus of the Border Patrol was 
on illegal aliens, alien smuggling, and narcotics interdictions. … After 9/11, it was 
apparent that smugglers’ methods, routes, and modes of transportation are potential 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorists and result in terrorist weapons illegally 
entering the United States… [T]he potential exists for a single individual or small group 
to cross the border undetected with biological or chemical weapons, weapons of mass 
effect, or other implements of terrorism. (Emphasis added, US Customs and Border 
Protection 2004: 4)  
The border-crossers and drug traffickers of 2000 became potential conduits for 
terrorist operations of 2004. Building on its 1994 “Prevention through Deterrence” 
Southwest Border Strategy, CBP asserted “the proper mix of assets increases the 
‘certainty of apprehension’ of those intending to illegally cross our borders,” which “has 
established a deterrent effect in targeted locations.”  Integrating the deterrence-through-
deportation strategy into its Secure Border Initiative (SBI), the newly formed 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rolled out a bundle of border surveillance 
technologies (aka SBInet), increased border patrols, and policy changes in 2005.  DHS 
expanded Expedited Removal from ports of entry to zones within 100 miles of the 
southern or coastal borders, and to all transboundary migrants caught within 14 days of 
arrival. Ending “catch and release policy,” DHS targeted “Other Than Mexicans,” 
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especially Central American migrants who could not be immediately deported and for 
whom INS and then DRO did not have sufficient detention space.  These “mission 
alignment” efforts linked border security to interior immigration enforcement and 
prosecution efforts.  In a bold overstatement later retracted by the agency, the ICE 
Office of Detention and Removal's "Operation Endgame" sought to “deport all 
deportable aliens” and to “support DHS efforts to deter illegal migration” (US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2003). ICE’s investigative sub-agencies focused 
on tracking and freezing trafficking assets, which included detaining and criminally 
charging smugglers. While these policies cannot be said to be "new" or specifically 
post-9/11, linking terrorism to immigration made unprecedented resources available to 
immigration authorities, and this expanded federal capacity has dramatically changed 
the conditions of everyday life for noncitizens in the United States. 
New institutional relationships between local and federal law enforcement, on 
the one hand, and criminal and immigration systems, on the other hand, have created a 
new geography of enforcement. Through the "Secure Communities" program all county 
jails will be required to share fingerprint data with immigration agencies and to notify 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of violations (US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement n.d.) by 2013. State legislatures and urban governments have 
taken on immigration policy-making in response to perceived shortcomings with 
national immigration policy (Varsanyi 2008). Furthermore, those detained at ports of 
entry are increasingly charged with immigration-related crimes through the Operation 
Streamline program (Buentello et al. 2010). Sentenced in large groups represented by a 
single public defendant, these migrants increasingly serve federal prison time before 
being transferred to immigration detention centers and deported. This widening dragnet 
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has led to long-term separation of families, a heightened sense of insecurity, and fear in 
migrant communities. In response, new and expanded immigrant rights organizations 
have formed to advocate for legal reform, to counter popular discourses of illegality and 
criminality, and to challenge specific enforcement practices (see Burridge and Loyd 
2007). The interiorization of immigration enforcement, linking of crime and 
immigration systems, and detention and incarceration infrastructure now play central 
roles in the complex political geography of exclusion in the United States. 
These new and expanded immigration enforcement practices made 
unprecedented numbers of noncitizens detainable and deportable. To address the lack of 
sufficient detention space, DHS opened a number of new, primarily private detention 
centers in the southwest United States, contracted with county jails through Inter-
Governmental Services Agreements (IGSA), and added beds to existing ICE facilities. 
As stated above, the T. Don Hutto Detention Center is owned by the Corrections 
Corporation of America, but ICE contracts with Williamson County, Texas, through an 
IGSA, and the county subcontracts to CCA. The West County Detention Center, 
discussed in the third section, is a county jail, and ICE rents bed space at the facility for 
immigration detainees from the county. Through these kinds of arrangements, ICE 
expanded the number of detention beds from 19,000 in 2005 to the current level of 
approximately 33,400. (ICE supervises an additional 19,000 noncitizens through 
“alternatives to detention” programs.)  As of September 2009, ICE owned six detention 
centers; of the remaining 243 detention centers, 14 are privately owned, dedicated 
detention facilities, and others are mixed facilities holding both convicted prisoners and 
civil immigration detainees (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009a). As 
more migrants became detainable, confinement has come to assume a central position in 
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DHS’ attempts to manage “illegal pathways” and flows.  Expanding detainability and 
bed space required a series of legal, administrative, and infrastructural changes and 
concretized detention’s increasingly important institutional location in immigration and 
border enforcement. The changing geography of enforcement is linked, as I elaborate in 
the next section, to spatial strategies of confinement, risk calculations, and disciplinary 
practices that render noncitizens legible as illegal subjects.  
 
Pathways In and Out of Detention  
As a result of expanded interior immigration and border enforcement, 
noncitizens come into contact with ICE in a variety of ways. In addition, Arizona, 
Georgia, and other state-level legislatures have passed legislation requiring state 
institutions to check immigration status. Departments of transportation, social service 
agencies, schools, streets, and even banks (have become sites of surveillance, policing, 
and potential arrest. While these policies vary from state to state, and county to county, 
everyday bureaucratic activities, such as drivers’ license renewals, require proof of 
authorized residency (Shahani and Greene 2009) and cause a blurring of historically 
separate social, state-level and foreign, federal policy-making (Coleman 2008, Varsanyi 
2008). Since 2006, ICE has also performed workplace enforcement actions and late-
night visits to noncitizens’ homes (popularly known as "raids.").  Noncitizens may, 
therefore, be rendered excludable far from the territorial border and long after entering 
the country. By linking with local law enforcement and a range of state institutions 
traditionally detached from federal law enforcement, ICE has been able to increase the 
potential points of contact between its agents and noncitizens (Coleman 2009). 
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During my research on family detention, I found that ICE detained people in a 
number of ways.   ICE apprehended some at ports of entry, particularly those who 
requested asylum upon arrival. For example, a Somali mother and child crossed the 
Mexico-US border, and a local resident advised them not to claim asylum; the mother 
maintained that since her family members received asylum, she should be able to 
acquire asylum too. The local resident called CBP, who detained the mother and child 
in a temporary facility, separated them for 10 days, and then transferred them together 
to Hutto. Another family crossed the Mexico-US border, only to have an acquaintance 
call CBP, because she feared harboring them would put herself at risk. Others were 
picked up from their homes, and still others apprehended on city streets. In a case that 
became an international scandal, ICE detained a Canadian-Iranian family when their 
flight to Canada made an emergency landing in Puerto Rico, despite the fact that they 
had never intended to enter the US (Democracy Now 2007). In another instance, ICE 
detained a boy travelling to the US alone to join his mother. When his mother arrived to 
pick him up from ICE, they detained her, as well, and transferred them both to Hutto. 
Families’ trajectories trace the geography of ICE’s expanded points of contact with 
migrants. 
Border, immigration, and other homeland security agency officers sometimes 
work together (though often they do not, see Hiemstra this volume), and they work for 
different agencies, under different mandates, and with different authority over the 
deportation process. Most women and families detained at Hutto were apprehended on 
the Mexico-US border and moved through CBP temporary holding facilities before 
being transferred to ICE detention centers. CBP runs a number of temporary “staging 
areas” and temporary detention centers that hold noncitizens for up to 72 hours. Those 
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caught in the interior might pass through a similar temporary detention center in an ICE 
office or be held for ICE at a local jail. Women currently detained at Hutto may be 
transferred to two or three temporary facilities before CBP transfers them to ICE.  
Conditions vary widely between detention centers, but federal guidelines do not require 
temporary facilities to have beds, consistent food, warm clothing, or hygiene facilities. 
Migrants passing through these facilities report sleeping on the floor, in very cold 
conditions, with little access to restrooms and sporadic meals. Because the 72-hour 
restrictions are extended for weekends and state holidays, detained women can be in 
temporary facilities for 3 to 10 days before being transferred to a permanent facility 
(Fieldnotes 2011).   
After coming into contact with CBP or ICE, noncitizens face a series of 
categorizations that impact where they will be detained, the possibility of release, and 
the likelihood of their deportation. Two factors have significant bearing on noncitizens’ 
detention trajectories: where and when they come in contact with immigration or law 
enforcement. Expedited Removal (ER) deputizes ICE officers to issue deportation 
orders to certain noncitizens without those persons seeing an immigration judge and 
triggers mandatory detention; ICE typically deports ER detainees in under 30 days. This 
timing applies to noncitizens that request asylum just as it applies to those apprehended 
along the southwestern border. As I explain further below, ICE classifies migrants 
detained at a Port of Entry, however, as “arriving aliens” and those caught inside US 
territory as “illegal aliens.”  These categories determine whether ICE will deem them 
eligible for release from detention on bond or parole.
4
 Noncitizens can exit Expedited 
                                                          
4
 The detainee makes a monetary deposit to signify their good faith effort to pursue their immigration or 
asylum claim. Bond and parole amounts range from zero (rare) to 10,000, and are forfeited completely if 
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Removal by requesting a Credible Fear Interview, in which an asylum officer with 
Citizenship and Immigration Services will determine their fear of persecution, the first 
step in claiming gaining a hearing before a judge.  
While the time and place of migrants’ contact with immigration officials 
determines migrants’ access to the immigration and/or asylum adjudication process, 
where they are detained and the duration of their detention, in practice, migrants’ 
pathways into and out of detention are not entirely predictable. Placement decisions rest 
with individual ICE officers, and some regional field offices chose to release families or 
parents of US citizen children despite DHS’ “catch and remove” policy (Fieldnotes 
2009, 2011; and see Gill 2009a; Weber 2003).  While ICE leadership provides 
guidelines exercising discretion (e.g. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2010), 
individual officers and field office directors are more and less sympathetic to 
“vulnerable populations.” Even with seemingly clear-cut mandatory detention cases, 
ICE officers retain much discretion to detain, release, and transfer detainees. Detained 
women’s and families’ fates are, in large part, determined by the deportation officer and 
immigration court judge they are assigned (Fieldnotes 2010). 
Privileging those within US territory over those outside of it (or in the process of 
passing into it), “illegal aliens” can be released from detention on bond, while “arriving 
aliens” can only be released on parole (see Figure 1). The difference between bond and 
parole is particularly important for asylum-seekers who claim asylum at a port of entry--
that is, those who avoid undocumented entry and seek legal entrance under established 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the detainee fails to complete the legal process. This financial risk is usually born by their families or 
networks, which becomes more complicated for those who do not have contacts with legal status. 
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humanitarian refugee law. Immigration judges determine bond eligibility and set bond 
amounts in noncitizens’ initial hearings. ICE Deportation Officers have the discretion to 
set parole, however, on the basis of their evaluations of detainees’ “flight risk.” Hutto’s 
Deportation Officers apply these evaluations in different ways, so that noncitizens' 
release on parole often depends on which officer they are assigned (In re: Hutto 
Detention Center Compliance Review 2 2008, Fieldnotes 2010). Both bond and parole 
require substantial financial deposits, ranging from $1,500 to $10,000 per person, but 
getting parole requires that “arriving aliens” find a sponsor to take responsibility for 
their welfare and court appearances. For families arriving without existing family or 
community support, raising this kind of money can be impossible. There is then a gap 
between noncitizens’ formal and actual opportunities for release (see Gill 2009a, 2009b 
and White 2002 for similar findings in the UK). The asylum process takes from six to 
twelve months--longer if the case is appealed--so prohibitively expensive parole 
amounts guarantee long detention stays, despite a Deportation Officers’ evaluation of a 
families’ low flight risk. This differentiation affords noncitizens present in US territory 
more procedural rights than those who have never been admitted, and this territorial 
hierarchy has long been considered precedent in immigration law (Neuman 2005).   
Because discretionary release is not a right, but an administrative decision made 
by ICE or an Immigration Judge, it is not bound by the norms of due process set out in 
the Constitution (Reno v. AADC 1999). Review and relief decisions cannot be appealed 
to a higher or external body. In the past, federal courts adjudicated appeals, but 
Congress limited these appeals to increase “administrative efficiency” and move 
noncitizens through the deportation process more quickly. Once detained, noncitizens 
are assigned an ICE Deportation Officers, and these officials decide on detainees' 
 14 
 
options for release. Federal courts have ruled, on these grounds, that constitutional due 
process norms do not apply to relief hearings. Because noncitizens cannot appeal 
discretionary relief decisions on due process grounds, relief decisions are exempt from 
federal or appellate court review (Neuman 2005). ICE and immigration courts retain, 
therefore, discretion over noncitizens’ pathways through the immigration system. 
Though distinct, these two forms of discretionary authority resonate and work together 
to limit the ability of noncitizens to appeal for relief from detention and deportation.  
In addition, these different legal regimes work to continually defer liability for 
detention conditions. In a 2007 lawsuit against the detention of families at Hutto (In re: 
Hutto Detention Center 2007), the judge found that the former medium-security prison's 
architecture and daily management qualified as "prison-like" conditions; holding 
children there with or without their parents violated children's rights under a previous 
legal settlement (Flores v. Meese 1997). While DHS and ICE officials were legally 
liable for Hutto's conditions, any changes to the facility were performed by the 
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), who owned and operated Hutto under 
contract with ICE and the local county.  ICE was responsible for Hutto's conditions, but 
did not manage them; the county was responsible for fulfilling their contract to provide 
detention services to ICE, but did not operate the detention center, and CCA was 
accountable to the conditions of its contract with the county, but not technically 
accountable to detained children.  As I describe in more detail below, these deferrals of 
legal responsibility impact outsiders' access to detention centers, as counties, ICE, and 
contractors continually defer to each other rather than commit to specific visitation 
policies. 
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A number of legal mechanisms structure noncitizens’ pathways into and out of 
detention. The time and place of their apprehension determines ICE’s categorization as 
either “arriving” or “illegal alien” which directly impacts noncitizens’ options for 
release from detention. This categorization is followed by evaluations of flight risk, 
community ties, and the availability of a sponsor, which differentiates noncitizens 
according to institutionalized understandings of “good” and “bad” immigrants. ICE 
officers retain, however, discretion over noncitizens’ detention, release, and transfer 
creating an opaque and unpredictable legal geography for noncitizens in immigration 
detention in the United States. One component in a larger assemblage of bordering 
practices, detention is a spatial practice through which transboundary migrants are 
contained in order to be made legible as noncitizens and either authorized or deported.  
 
Challenging Detention 
Arbitrary transfers, solitary confinement, indefinite detention stays, and 
detention’s remoteness have elicited critical responses from diverse perspectives, from 
civil and international human rights to anti-racist and prison abolitionist to youth justice 
to employer trade associations.  The geographies of policing, inter-jurisdictional law 
enforcement collaboration, forced mobility, and family separation have animated 
noncitizen communities and immigrant rights advocates across the United States, who 
have used public demonstrations, vigils, media campaigns, legislative advocacy, 
community organizing, and civil disobedience to challenge what are widely perceived 
to be repressive forms of state power. Among these tactics, each of which mobilize 
spatial politics in their own right, I focus on detention visitation here because it places 
authorized residents (citizens and documented noncitizens) in a direct relationship to 
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detained individuals in immigration proceedings, immigration and detention center 
staff, and detention center spaces.  While they differ in scope and origin, detention 
visitation programs focus on detainees’ emotional, bodily, and spiritual experiences of 
detention. These programs must also negotiate with detention center operators and ICE 
to gain and maintain access to detention centers, requiring specific strategies of 
engagement and (self-)representation (see also Moran 2011). Below, I explore how 
visitation illuminates detention’s spatial politics. Visitors’ access requires careful 
mediation with detention center operators, ICE, and sometimes local officials. As 
described above, immigration detention is largely subcontracted to private companies 
and county governments (who may themselves subcontract to private companies), and 
detention center operators have discretion over visitation policy at each detention 
center. While ICE provides general guidelines nationally, visitors face different policies 
at each detention center, revealing much about the uneven landscape of detention center 
conditions and management. Working to gain access to detention from “the outside,” 
the process of visitation partially makes transparent the largely opaque spatial regulation 
of noncitizen populations.  
Detention visitation programs have multiplied from four to sixteen since 2009 
and while they take different forms they build on shared principles of companionship 
and solidarity.  In 2009, David Fraccaro, a long-time volunteer with Sojourners’ 
visitation program in New York City, began coordinating monthly conference calls, and 
the Detention Watch Network (DWN) provided visitors across the US with an email 
list-serve for increased communication and space on DWN’s website for outreach to 
new programs.  This national visitation network grew out of an emerging desire to 
address immigration detention’s expansion “in our own backyards.” Organizers and 
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advocates sought ways to reach out to and serve detained people directly, and to 
challenge local manifestations of national anti-immigration policies. Through the 
national network, visitation programs affiliate around broad principles of 
companionship, accompaniment, human rights, and advocacy, share best practices, and 
troubleshoot commonly shared barriers. Each program however develops its own 
approach, relationship to local detention officials, and procedures to respond to the 
specific arrangements at their local detention facility. While visitation programs have 
tended to be attached to universities and religious institutions, they are distinct from 
recognized religious ministries who offer services and counseling within detention 
centers. The visitation programs discussed here have modeled themselves on 
Sojourner’s model of friendship, accompaniment, and witnessing and clearly position 
themselves against proselytizing (Detention Watch Network 2010). These programs do 
not offer formal legal advice, though some maintain relationships with pro bono legal 
representation and the Visitation Network encourages individual programs to collect 
and report information on human rights infringements.  
While visitation policies differ from facility to facility, visitors face certain 
standard practices throughout the detention system.  Detention center operators usually 
confine visitors to public visitation spaces, and do not allow them into detention 
centers’ interior. While the T. Don Hutto Detention Center allows contact visits, most 
detention centers utilize prison-style visitation, in which visitors and detainees speak 
through plexiglass and telephones.
5
  Visitors are submitted to background checks and 
                                                          
5
 In 2007, the ACLU and UT Law School Immigration Law Clinic sued ICE for holding families in 
prison-like conditions at T. Don Hutto Detention Center, located in Taylor, Texas (In re: Hutto Detention 
Center 2007). Contact visitation was a condition of the lawsuit’s settlement, and the facility has 
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pass through some form of inspection, such as x-ray machines, at each detention center. 
Visitors cannot bring belongings in with them, except for ID and car keys. Importantly, 
documentation of legal residency is required for visitation. Detention center staff can 
revoke visitation privileges at any time for any reason. Thus, the process of visiting a 
detainee requires subjecting oneself to the spatial ordering and data collection regimes 
of the detention center. Occupying a ‘liminal space’ between inside and outside (Moran 
2011), visitation is therefore a fraught enterprise, especially for those engaged in other 
forms of opposition to detention and deportation. The process embodies--for visitors 
and for my purposes here--the arbitrary exercise of state power, the blurring of authority 
between federal immigration officers and contractors, and the ways in which detention 
centers regulate bodies within and beyond their boundaries (see also Coutin 2010, 
Mountz 2010). Below I discuss these dynamics in two visitation programs.  
Organizers of the campaign to close the T. Don Hutto Family Residential 
Facility began to explore visitation after ICE released families from Hutto in September 
2009. The former medium-security prison held families with minor children from 2006-
2009, but converted half of its bedspace to "noncriminal females" in 2007, when ICE 
found insufficient numbers of families to fill the beds (Fieldnotes 2009). When families 
were released, the facility converted to an all-female facility and maintained most of the 
adjustments made to soften the facility from a prison to a "residential facility" (see 
Martin 2011, 2012). Local immigrant rights organizers were concerned, however, that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
maintained that policy and other reforms, championing Hutto as a “humane residential facility” (see 
Martin 2011, forthcoming b). In 2011, however, a former guard was convicted of sexually abusing female 
detainees, highlighting the gap between agency policy and contractor behavior (Wolfson and Cargile 
2011). 
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Hutto's conditions might backslide to pre-lawsuit conditions. Hutto’s pro bono attorneys 
reported that most women were separated from their families, either in their home 
countries or in the US, and that this isolation caused them significant stress. 
Furthermore, organizers recognized that advocating around an adult population would 
require different tactics and a longer-term strategy, since adult detainees do not harness 
the same media sympathy that families had attracted.   
Drawing from on the Sojourner’s model, Hutto volunteers adapted the 
orientation manual, developed relationships with local attorneys to find detainees who 
wanted visits, and began training volunteers with the support of the University of Texas 
Community Engagement Center. Contrary to organizers’ fears, CCA maintained its 
visitation policies from family detention, allowing visitors to see 1 or 2 women for one 
hour per day, as long as the visitor presented CCA with the woman’s ID number. This 
allowed HVP volunteers to visit without seeking permission or distinct authorization 
from CCA or ICE. Unlike other facilities, prior authorization is not required. In 2011, 
HVP volunteers visited 22 women over 41 visits. The program generally has a small 
group of regular volunteer visitors who meet with 1-2 women per visit, and try to see 
the same woman each visit until she is released or deported. HVP receives names of 
interested women from a local Legal Orientation Program, who carries a sign-up sheet 
to weekly Spanish-language legal rights sessions. The program is limited, therefore, by 
its reliance on Spanish speakers who attend the weekly program, a matter discussed 
often at the organization’s monthly meetings.  The HVP holds monthly “report back” 
meetings so that visitors can troubleshoot any issues that arise; process the emotions 
drawn up by visiting, leaving, and very often hearing deeply troubling stories; and 
discuss how to better advocate for detained women.  
 20 
 
As described above, detention center contractors stipulate visitation policy. In 
the county jails that detain noncitizens in immigration proceedings, detainees are 
subject to the prison's visitation policy, as well. In most county jails, inmates must name 
and request the visitor, which requires that they be in touch with said visitor by phone or 
mail. Telephone rates are prohibitively expensive, and detainees usually prefer to use 
calling cards to speak with family, rather than volunteer programs. (In many cases 
detainees do not have enough money for calling cards in the first place.) In 
contradistinction to facilities like Hutto, where visitors can request a visit without 
having to coordinate with the women ahead of time, county jail visitation requires 
phone access and money from detainees. This creates particular challenges for non-
family visitors because it is difficult to establish an initial relationship with detainees 
sufficient to encourage them to make the request. As Detention Dialogues, a visitation 
program in California's San Francisco Bay area, coordinators noted, it is impossible for 
county jail detention visitation programs to "fly under the radar" as at Hutto, because 
detainees and visitors had no way of contacting each other. 
To gain access to the West County Detention Center, Detention Dialogues (DD) 
coordinators Christina Fialho and Christina Mansfield spent over a year getting ICE’s 
and Contra Costa County’s approval, with the support of Santa Clara University’s 
Ignatian Center. At first, Fialho and Mansfield were unsure whether ICE was holding 
noncitizens in the Bay Area at all, as county jails do not often advertise their presence. 
After a county official claimed that Santa Clara County had never had a relationship 
with ICE, Fialho and Mansfield filed a public records request, which revealed that the 
county had been detaining noncitizens since the 1990s, but had ended its contract with 
ICE in 2010.  Through conversations with attorneys, Fialho and Mansfield eventually 
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located three county jails in the region holding ICE detainees: the West County 
Detention Facility in Contra Costa County, Sacramento County Jail, and Yuba County 
Jail. They approached West County staff, who referred them to ICE for permission. 
ICE, in turn, referred them back to the jail's administrators, a deferral process frequently 
encountered by visitation programs and discussed on Visitation Network conference 
calls. Ultimately, jail administrators stated that they did not have the budget to support a 
visitation program. Fialho and Mansfield convinced jail staff that they were not 
requesting financial resources, but instead were providing them no-cost services by 
visiting and connecting detainees to wider service provider networks. Convinced of the 
benefit of free social services, the jail agreed to allow the visitation program to proceed, 
and has allowed DD to establish a free phone extension so that detainees can request 
visits without a calling card. (This arrangement is based on the existing system granting 
detainees access to pro bono legal representation.)   
The phone system works intermittently, however, sometimes connecting to 
voicemail instead of ringing DD offices, sometimes disconnecting, and sometimes 
connecting successfully. Because of these infrastructural difficulties, DD has performed 
two volunteer orientations, but has yet to organize actual visits to the facility. The 
vagaries of the telephone system requires continual interaction and negotiation between 
DD coordinators and jail staff, so that building working relationships with staff 
members has become critical to the larger mission of the visitation program. According 
to DD's coordinators, certain staff members have become invested in the phone system 
to the extent that they, too, are frustrated with its problems and now advocate for the 
program themselves. Creating new alliances between volunteers and staff, the visitation 
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program disrupts clean boundaries between interest groups and, Fialho and Mansfield 
argue, opens up possibilities for advocating for detained noncitizens.   
The differences between the Hutto Visitation Program and Detention Dialogues 
are stark. The program's respective facilities are governed by a different complex of 
private and inter-governmental contractors, with significant consequences for visitation 
programs. HVP, for example, spent considerably less time and energy gaining access 
and has no consistent communication with Hutto staff, while DD has spent upwards of a 
year figuring out where ICE detainees are held, how to visit them, building relationships 
with staff, and implementing a phone system. The process of gaining access to detention 
centers reveals an uneven geography of overlapping county, state, and federal 
jurisdictions, private contracting, and delegated authority. These recurring, localized 
difficulties have led Fialho and Mansfield to focus energies on advocating for national 
visitation policies in order to streamline new visitors’ access. By sharing best practices 
and comparing strategies, previously isolated visitation programs have developed a 
broader analysis of detention’s geographies of exclusion, which in turn has catalyzed a 
local-national, interscalar advocacy strategy. 
Conclusion  
Though the US Congress has not passed new immigration legislation since 
1996, expanded financial resources and policy changes have transformed the 
institutional and material landscapes of immigration enforcement for noncitizens. 
Policing immigration status in more places, CBP and ICE draw more noncitizens into 
custody, and Expedited Removal's expansion triggers mandatory detention for more 
noncitizens. Once in the detention system, noncitizens face limited opportunities for 
release. While the Obama administration has committed to locating new detention 
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centers near legal resources (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b), ICE 
has contracted the vast majority of its detention centers in remote areas, where legal 
representation and familial support is scarce. The lack of proximity to advocacy groups 
in more populated areas decreases the chances for sustainable visitation programs for 
detainees, constituting a deviously shrewd form of spatial “distance decay” on the part 
of private and state institutions.  Once detained, noncitizens are subject to arbitrary 
transfers, often to federal districts where judges are unsympathetic to asylum or relief 
claims (Morawetz 2004).  Detainees' categorizations as "illegal" or "arriving aliens" 
differentiate access to release options further, based on the time and place of contact 
with border/immigration enforcement. Thus pathways into and out of detention are 
determined by a combination of institutional resources, agency policy-making, officers' 
individual decision-making, and individuals' case details.  This is a complex carceral 
and legal geography, in which noncitizens' rights are limited and the federal 
government's discretion to detain is extended in and through immigration law.  
Noncitizens are "illegalized" (De Genova 2002) through this assemblage of legal 
mechanisms, enforcement tactics, and discursive formations, and spatiotemporality of 
detention renders them excludable "by geographical design" (Mountz 2010). These 
relations of power are spatialized through the disciplining, forced mobility, and 
confinement of certain bodies; the production of surveillance, transportation, and 
detention infrastructure; and the territorialization of certain forms of nationhood and 
state power. 
This chapter has traced two different legal geographies of US immigration 
detention: noncitizens' pathways into and out of detention, and authorized residents' 
access to detainees and detention centers. Mediating the relationship between detainees 
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and the wider population of authorized residents, these release and visitation policies 
reveal the high degree of discretion Department of Homeland Security agencies hold 
over the detention process. Decisions about individual migrants' cases are ostensibly 
guided by immigration legislation's admission and exclusion rules, yet ICE's wide 
discretion to decide who to detain, where, and when allows them to delegate detention 
functions to county jail and private corrections staff who would otherwise have no 
authority to enforce immigration law. The process of exclusion, or the inscribing of 
national boundaries onto mobile noncitizen bodies, unfolds through an assemblage of 
legal categorizations, discretionary release decisions, visitation policies, and multi-
jurisdictional governance relationships.  
While detention disciplines noncitizens through surveillance and containment, it 
also works on noncitizens' relationships and communities, on visitors, on the potentially 
detainable, and on the deported (Coleman 2008, Coutin 2010, Hiemstra 2010 & this 
volume, Mountz 2010, Zilberg 2011).  Detention's disciplinarity is not therefore 
confined to the detention center itself, but acts upon and through wider networks of 
intimacy, support, and forced mobility (Conlon 2010, Martin 2012a). Detention is not 
only “a doing,” as Gregory (2006) argues, but a spatial practice through which federal 
agencies mark both the difference between authorized and unauthorized bodies and the 
state's power to maintain that boundary. The regulation of detainees' and visitors' 
movement into and out of detention spatializes this bordering process, stretching the 
size, shape, and scope of the border itself and localizing it far from the territorial limits 
of the nation-state.  
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APPENDIX A: Acronyms 
CBP Customs and Border Patrol 
CCA Corrections Corporation of America 
CFI Credible Fear Interview 
DD Detention Dialogues 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DRO Detention and Removals Office 
ER Expedited Removal Program 
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 
IIRIRA  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
USCIS US Citizenship and Immigration Service 
SBI Secure Border Initiative 
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Figure 1: Flow Chart of Release, Detention, and Deportation Decisions for Arriving and 
Illegal Aliens in the US Immigration System 
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